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INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP MEDIA RELEASES

NEPAL: RESPONDING TO THE RoYAL C ouP
Kathmandu/Brussels. February 24, 2005
King Gyanendra's seizure of power and arrest of democratic
party leaders on l February 2005 will likely aid the Maoist
insurgency and intensify the civil war. But by bringing the
crisis to a head he has created an opportunity for diplomatic
efforts to pull Nepal back from the brink of collapse and
develop an effective counter-insurgency strategy. The key
countries and organisations involved in the countryIndia, the U.S., the UK and the UN- need to work together
to strengthen a collapsing state and establish a plan to deal
with the Maoist insurgency. Acceptance of the · coup and
lack of action would only increase the chances of a Maoist
victory and a descent into worse violence.
There is also an urgent human rights crisis in Nepal that
requires international action. The record on disappearances
and extra-judicial killings is one of the world's worst. Hundreds of political figures and activists have been detained,
and protests have been violently suppressed. An expanded
campaign against the Maoists by the Royal Nepalese Army
(RNA) is likely to result in worsening abuses while offering
no realistic chance of defeating the insurgency or reaching
a negotiated solution. At the same time, the government is
vulnerable to external pressure because it is heavily dependent on foreign aid.
The policy priorities should be:
•re-establishment of constitutional rule, including restoration of all suspended freedoms, release of all people arrested in the royal crackdown since l February 2005 and
revocation of the state of emergency;
•expanded protection of human rights, including through
full and immediate access to all places of detention for the
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);
•a stronger legal framework to protect rights, including
through repeal of the Terrorism and Destructive Activities
Ordinance (TADO);
•re-establishment of democratic institutions and strengthening of the state's administrative and governance capacity
across the country; and
•a broad-based political, security and socio-economic
strategy to address not only the insurgency but also the underlying issues that have fuelled it.
To achieve these, donors should immediately implement a
range of measures to pressure the royal government. Instead
of vague threats, they should take the following steps at once
and only lift them when specific conditions are met:
•suspend all military assistance that is not essential to

maintaining the security status quo;
• suspend all direct bilateral and multilateral budgetary
support to the government;
•initiate a review of all current development assistance
and prepare plans for phased suspension and withdrawal
of these programs;
•signal displeasure with the l<ing's action by diplomatic
and protocol means (including cancellation of visits and
invitations); and
•support a strong resolution on human rights at the UN
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in March 2005.
he best mechanism to coordinate this would be a Contact Group bringing together the major powers and institutions that have been active in developing a policy towards
Nepal's conflict. This group might in turn appoint a special
envoy to advance its agreed political response to the coup
and the insurgency. It vvill not be easy to achieve all policy
objectives but a demonstrably united international front
would demand attention in Kathmandu and be able to send
a strong message to all involved that political institutions
must be rebuilt if the state is to survive the insurgency. If
the country's main political forces cannot agree on a common agenda, they all stand to lose.
The Contact Group and other donors should make clear
that they expect the measures demanded to be taken immediately and to be sustained. The royal government must
be judged on its actions rather than its public pronouncements . If the initial round of pressure does not achieve results, and the king is still unwilling to relinquish absolute
power, donors should consider:
•suspending all military aid, including provision of spare
parts for vehicles and helicopters and aviation fuel;
•suspending all assistance (including development assistance) apart from humanitarian aid;
•introducing targeted sanctions including a freeze of the
assets of the royal family, senior officials, military officers and
their families, visa bans and suspension of the RNA's lucrative involvement in UN peacekeeping operations; and
•encouraging the Security Council to investigate and prosecute both government and Maoist suspects who have escaped justice due to Nepal's inadequate judicial procedures.
Should the king still drag his feet, it would be time to
consider more radical options, including international
expressions of support for a republic rather than constitutional monarchy. Gyanendra may well have tipped support
within the country decisively toward a republic already but

he should be offered one last chance to agree to policies that
would allow the Nepali state to respond effectively to the
Maoist challenge. If he continues on his present course, his
coup will mark a stage leading to intensified conflict and
possibly a Maoist victory.

Asia Briefing N°36 Reprinted by Permission from
International Crisis Group
For more details on the coup see Crisis Group Asia Report
N°9l, Nepal's Royal Coup: Making a Bad Situation 'Norse, 9

NEPAL: HoLD THE KING TO H 1s P ROMISES
February 2005.
Website: www.crisisgroup.org
Brussels, 9 May 2005: King Gyanendra's self imposed 100day deadline to restore order and lay out a road map for
democracy and peace in Nepal will pass on 11 May, with only
limited progress towards these aims . As the conflict with the
Maoists continues to worsen, the International Crisis Group
urges the international community to take concerted action
to help turn the situation around.
In a letter (full text below) addressed to UK Prime Minister
Tony Blair, U.S . Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Indian
External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh, and UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan, Crisis Group calls for the establishment
of a contact group to negotiate a return to democracy, the
maintenance of restrictions on military aid to Nepal until
democracy has been restored, and full international support
for the monitoring mission by the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights .
Since the King's 1 February coup, the intensification of the
conflict has been dramatic, with at least 655 people killed in
the last three months. State Security forces were responsible
for at least 530 of those deaths , many apparently innocent
civilians, and the Maoists have killed 125 people, many of
these also civilians. There is no new military strategy to deal
with the insurgency, and the chances of developing a viable
political strategy, without which any military operations
cannot be effective, have been further reduced.
Although the international response to the coup has been
firm to date and has forced the king to reconsider some of
his actions, the questions of restoring democracy and tackling the insurgency have not been addressed.
Only when a broad-based strategy can be agreed on and
implemented by all democratic political forces in Kathmandu will talks with the Maoists be possible that stand any
chance of success. But without further strong .international
pressure, the king will continue to entrench his power at
the expense of democracy, and Nepal will continu~ to suffer
from devastating conflict.
To find out more about the crisis in Nepal, visit our Nepal
advocacy page. This page has details of Crisis Group's reports
and opinion pieces on the conflict, details of our advocacy efforts to date, information on what you can do to support Crisis
Group's efforts , and links to other resources on the conflict.

6 May 2005
[UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice, Indian External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh, and UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan]
In February 2005, I wrote to you to urge joint action on Nepal to avert the risk of a worsening conflict in the wake of King
Gyanendra's takeover of power. Under international pressure, the
king set himself a deadline of one hundred days to restore order
and lay out a road map for democracy and peace. The deadline
passes on ll May and to date there has only been limited progress
towards these aims.
There have been some steps forward. The agreement on monitoring by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights may help
reduce the many civilian victims of the conflict and end the climate
of impunity. And the state of emergency has been lifted, although
many restrictions remain. But Nepal is no closer to peace, and is
a long way from restoring even the semblance of democracy that
existed before:
• The intensification of the conflict has been dramatic, with
death rates doubling: at least 655 people were killed from l February to 30 April. State security forces were responsible for 530 of
these deaths, many apparently innocent civilians, while the 125
people killed by the Maoists included many civilian victims of
bombs and landmines.
• There is no new military strategy to deal with the insurgency.
The RNA remains an ineffective fighting force largely confined to
defensive deployment in urban areas. The army has clone nothing
to re-establish a government presence across Nepal's countryside,
most of which remains under the sway of the Maoists.
• The chances of developing a viable political strategy, without
which any military operations cannot be effective, have been further reduced. The king's major aim appears to have been to attack
moderate political parties and civil society--the very groups which
were most vocally critical of the Maoists.
• Statements by the king and his ministers have paid lip service to
democracy but their actions point to a determined entrenchment of
royal power. The appointment of local and regional administrators
answerable directly to the palace, the public support for the coup by
the nominally independent Chief justice of the Supreme Court and
the continued attacks on freedom of speech are designed to shore up
the king at the expense of representative parties.
Crisis Group welcomes the firm international response to the
coup. The suspension of military aid, accompanied by the cancel-

lation of some budgetary support and rev iews of other assistance,
has forced th e king to recon sider some of hi s acti ons.
However, the questions of restoring democ racy an d tac kling the
insurgency have not bee n addressed. 1vleas ures such as the lifting
of the emergency and announcement of municipal elections will
not in themselves change the realit y of absolute palace rule. The
lack of a viable strategy to deal with the lvlao ist challenge will continue to be debilitating, especiall y give n the political polarisation
and mistrust in Kathmandu.
Crisis Group believes that the ste ps outlined in our briefing
paper Nepal: Responding to the Roya l Coup, published on 24
February 2005 (forwarded to you under se parate cover, and also
accessible on our website, www.crisisgroup.org) still offer a way
to co nsolid ate demo cracy and rebuild the key state institutions:
th e found ation s of a broad-based political, sec urity and socio-economic strategy that wou ld address not only the insurgency but also
the underlying issues that have fu elled it. Only when such a strategy can be agreed on and implemented by all democratic political
forces in Kathmandu will talks with the Maoists be possible that
stand any chance of success.

Concerted ac ti on by India, the United States, th e United Kingdom and the United Nations co uld turn aro und the situat ion and
reduce the dangers of the Maoists mak ing furth er ga ins. \"1./e urge
you , accordin gly, to :
• estab li sh a co ntact group that wo uld appo int an interm edi ary
to nego ti ate a return to democ racy and the participation in gove rnment or th e main political parties;
• maintain restrictions on military aiel until the king has rees tablished democracy and, toget her with the parties, developed a
political plan to tackle the Maoists; and
• ensure that the UNHCHR mission moves ahead rapidly with
full intern ational support.
The king's deadline is an opportunity to fo cus attention again on
this serious conOict.
Gareth Evans, President
The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, multinational organisation covering over 50
cri sis-affected countries and territories across four continents,
working through field-based analysis and hi gh-level advocacy to
prevent and resolve deadly conOict.
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Un ited Na tions Na tional Development Progra m (UNDP) es tim a tes of sec urity r isk to donors by di strict. Ph ase I indica tes moderately sec ure,
Ph ase II indi ca tes moderate sec urity probl ems , and Ph ase Ill indicates areas of g reatest ri sk (quo ted by the World Bank , 200 4) .
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